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Note

ABEX CORPORATION v. BRINKLEY
BURDEN OF PROOF IN PROCEEDINGS TO MODIFY
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION AGREEMENTS

INTRODUCTION
In workman's compensation cases, the amount of disability
compensation which the injured employee receives is based upon
the degree of disability; the greater the disability the larger the
compensation.1 Thus, for an employer to reduce total disability
payments to partial disability payments, it must be shown that the
claimant is no longer totally disabled.2 To prove such a reduction
of disability the employer must show that: (1) the claimant is no
longer totally physically disabled and is now capable of performing
general light work; and (2) such work, commensurate with the
claimant's qualifications and ability, is generally available.3 However, there is disagreement among the courts as to the requisite
proof of the availability of work needed to satisfy the second requirement.
1. Ham v. Chrysler Corp., 231 A.2d 258 (Del. 1967); Kish v. Steele
Coal Co., 185 Pa. Super. 257, 137 A.2d 855, 856 (1958); Hartnett Corp. v.
Coleman, 226 A.2d 910 (Del. 1967).
2. Ham v. Chrysler Corp., 231 A.2d 258 (Del. 1967); Hartnett Corp. v.
Coleman, 226 A.2d 910 (Del. 1967); Federal Bake Shops, Inc. v. Maczynski,
180 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. 1962). (If claimant can find a job commensurate
with his qualifications and training, payments for total disability can end
or be reduced to those for partial disability).
3. Ham v. Chrysler Corp., 231 A.2d 260 (Del. 1967); Hartnett Corp.
v. Coleman, 226 A.2d 913 (Del. 1967); Kish v. Steele Coal Co., 185 Pa. Super.
257, 137 A.2d 856 (1958). See, e.g., Unora v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 377 Pa. 7,
104 A.2d 104 (1954); Federal Bake Shops, Inc. v. Maczynski, 180 A.2d 616
(Del. Super. 1962); Kirk v. L. Bauer, Jr., Inc., 20 Pa. Super. 357, 228 A.2d 228
(1967).
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This Note will examine the required specificity of proof as to
the availability of jobs which must be proved by the employer in
order to obtain a reduction of a total disability award. Specific attention will be given to the recent Delaware case of Abex Corp. v.
Brinkley 4 and the effect of that decision on the determination of the
following questions: (1) who shall have the burden of proof? (2)
what is the amount and nature of the proof which the employer
must present in order to meet his burden?
I.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This Note is concerned with the problems of proof which arise
from a suit by an employer to modify the workmen's compensation
agreement between himself and a disabled claimant. When an
employer sues to have a compensation agreement modified from one
for total disability to one for partial disability, he must show that
the claimant has partially recovered from his disabling injury. 5 A
claimant's degree of disability is determined by a consideration of
not only his physical recovery, but also his ability to find suitable
light work.6 His standing in the labor market, determined by
his medical-economic position, is the criterion for determining the
degree of his disability. A claimant's physical recovery may not be
accompanied by an economic recovery-the ability to find suitable
work. For example, in Lightner v. Cohn,7 the court awarded total
disability payments to a claimant who was only twenty-five per
cent physically disabled because it found that he was unable to find
suitable work as a result of his disability, even though his physical
handicap was relatively small.
The problem of proof with which this Note is concerned is not
the proving of a claimant's physical recovery, but rather with the
proving of claimant's ability to find suitable light work. This problem is two-fold: (1) As between the employer and the claimant,
who has the burden of proving the availability of light work, and
(2) How specific must the proof of the availability of suitable jobs
be?
The majority rule concerning the burden of proof is that in a
4. 252 A.2d 552 (Del. Super. 1969).

5. Cases cited note 3 supra.
6. Id.
7. 76 N.J. Super. 461, 184 A.2d 878 (1962). See Lee v. Minneapolis
Street Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1950). Cf. Durney's
Case, 222 Mass. 461, 111 N.E. 166 (1916); Jordan v. Decorative Co., 230 N.Y.
322, 130 N.E. 634 (1921) (claimant's inability to find work must be a result
of the injury, and not the result of outside factors such as labor market
fluctuations or economic cycles).

suit to modify a compensation agreement, the burden of proof is
on the moving party to show a change in the claimant's condition.8 Thus it is clear that, according to the majority rule, when
an employer is alleging a claimant's partial recovery he must show
that claimant has physically recovered and that suitable light work
is available to him. The proof of claimant's physical condition is
usually routine. The difficulty arises in determining how specific
the proof of the availability of jobs must be. This point is critical
because if the employer can prove that jobs are available the burden of proof then shifts to the claimant, who must prove that such
jobs are not available. The moving party rule only requires proof
of the general availability of jobs, thus allowing the employer to
meet his burden rather easily. 9 The fairness of this result is questionable since the employer has forced the claimant into court.
Whether the employer should be able to shift the burden of proof
so easily to the uncomplaining claimant is the question to which
the court addressed itself in Abex.
II.

ABEX CORP. V. BRINKLEY'

0

In Abex Corp. v. Brinkley the former employer of a claimant
who had been receiving total disability payments under the
Delaware Workmen's Compensation Law" appealed a finding of
the Industrial Accident Board, in which the Board had denied the
employer's petition to terminate total disability payments to the
claimant. The employer had alleged in his petition to the Board
that the claimant was sufficiently recovered to perform general
light work, and that such work was available to the claimant in the
12
area.
8. E.g., Ex parte G.C. Brown & Co., 211 Ala. 230, 100 So. 771 (1943);
Brown v. Industrial Accident Commission of Cal., 44 Cal. App. 2d 6, 111
P.2d 931 (D.C. Cal., 3rd Dist., 1940); Cole v. City of Miami, 52 Ariz. 488,
83 P.2d 997 (1961); Fortson v. American Sur. Co., 92 Ga. App. 625, 89 S.E.2d
671 (1955); Boshers v. Payne, 58 Idaho 109, 70 P.2d 391 (1937); Consolidated
Coal of Saint Louis v. Industrial Comm'n., 315 Iil. 428, 146 N.E. 442 (1953);
Earhart v. Cyclone Fence Co., 102 Ind. App. 634, 4 N.E.2d 571 (1960); Jones
W.U. Tel. Co., 165 Kan. 1, 192 P.2d 141 (1948); W.E. Caldwell Co. v. Borders,
301 Ky. 843, 193 S.W.2d 453 (1946); Connelly's Case, 122 Me. 289, 119 A. 664
(1923); Pretzer v. State Psychopathic Hospital, 286 Mich. 454, 282 N.W. 213
(1934); Bomersine v. Armour & Co., 255 Minn. 157, 30 N.W.2d 526 (1947);
Ludwickson v. Central States Electric Co., 142 Neb. 308, 6 N.W.2d 65
(1942); Armstrong v. Lake Tarleton Hotel Corp., 103 N.H. 450, 174 A.2d 410
(1961); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Klochanski, 9 N.J. Super. 361, 74 A.2d
432 (1949); Rotino v. J.P. Scanlon, Inc., 125 N.J.L. 227, 15 A.2d 336 (Sup.
Ct. 1940); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Duncan, 297 P.2d 663 (Okla. 1956) (rehearing denied); Holtz v. McGraw & Bindley, 161 Pa. Super. 371, 54 A.2d
905 (1950); Old Dominion Land Co. v. Messick, 149 Va. 330, 141 S.E. 132
(1928); Karlsen v. Department of Labor & Industries of Wash., 26 Wash. 2d
310, 173 P.2d 1001 (1946); Hipke v. Badger Paper Mills, 261 Wis. 226, 52
N.W.2d 401 (1952).
9. Cases cited note 8 supra.
10. 252 A.2d 552 (Del. Super. 1969).
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2324 (1953).
12. 252 A.2d at 553.
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Hence, the employer, who admitted that he had the burden of
proof under the majority rule, proved only the general availability
of jobs which claimant could physically perform. The employer's
expert testified only that general light work which claimant was
capable of performing was available in the area. However, claimant's entire condition-his age, training, skill, and disability-was
not considered. Nor was it shown how prospective employers might
react to the claimant in his present condition.13 In fact, the employer's expert testified that he did not know how an employer
14
might react to this particular claimant.
The court held that such evidence was insufficient to prove
that a reduction in disability payments was warranted. 1 The court
thus recognized the hesitance of employers to hire the handicapped,
even though the partially disabled person is physically capable of performing the particular job.'1
In so holding, Abex extended an earlier Delaware case, Ham v.
Chrysler Corp.,17 in which the court held that, in determining
claimant's disability, claimant's entire physical and economic condition must be considered.' That is, claimant's bargaining position
in the labor market, considering his disability, must be the criterion
for apportioning his disability payments.19 The Ham decision held
that evidence of existing work which the claimant is physically capable of performing is insufficient proof that the claimant could actually secure such work. The inability to secure work, the Ham
court stated, is equally as damaging to a claimant as the inability to
work.20 However, the Ham court did not decide what standard of
specificity should be required.
In Abex, the Delaware Superior Court followed Ham in stating
that evidence of claimant's ability to perform work and the general
availability of such work did not satisfy the employer's burden of
proof. 2 1 The court then clarified the Ham decision by holding that

the employer must present evidence of the availability of work
13. Id. at 554.
14. Id.
15. 252 A.2d at 553.
16. Id.
17. 231 A.2d 258, 261 (Del. 1967).
18. Id. at 260. The court said:
The proper balancing of the medical and wage loss factors is the
essence of the problem . . . inability to secure work ... is as an
important factor as the inability to work.
Id. at 260.
19. Id. at 261.
20. Id.
21. 252 A.2d at 553.

suited for the particularclaimant before disability payments could
be terminated. 22 The court stated:
A showing of physical ability to perform certain appropriate jobs and the general availability of such jobs is, in this
court's opinion, an insufficient showing of the availability
of said jobs to a particularclaimant and that a showing of
this latter factor is necessary to satisfy
the burden of prov23
ing that total disability has ended.
Thus, in Delaware it is 'no longer sufficient to simply show the
general availability of work which a claimant is physically capable
of performing and which is commensurate with his qualifications.
Instead, it must be shown that suitable work within claimant's
capabilities is available to the specific claimant; i.e., that suitable
employers would be willing to hire the claimant with his disability.

24

It should be pointed out that the Abex court specifically stated
that by its holding it was not requiring the employer to actually
find other employers who would hire the claimant. 25 It is submitted, however, that requiring the employer to prove the existence
of other employers who would be willing to hire claimant is practically the same as forcing the employer to find a new position for the
claimant. A discussion of the equities in forcing an employer to
relocate a claimant is not within the scope of this paper. But it
should be noted that since Abex went as far as it did in enlarging
the specificity of proof, if it had gone one step further, and required the employer to relocate a disabled former employee, the
additional hardship on the employer, in the light of the actual
Abex requirement, would have been small as compared to the benefit to the claimant.
III.

THE REASON FOR THE ABEX DECISION

In order to appreciate the importance of the Abex decision, the
entire area of the degree and burden of proof required to show the
availability or unavailability of suitable jobs for the claimant in
workmen's compenation cases must be considered.
The majority of states follow the "moving party rule."26 As
previously discussed the elements of this rule are twofold. First,
the rule states that in a proceeding to modify a compensation
agreement from total disability to partial disability, the moving
party has the burden of proof.27

Second, the rule requires that if

the employer is the moving party, in addition to claimant's physical recovery, he must prove also the general availability of such
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id,
Id.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 554.
Cases cited note 8 supra.
Id.
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work in the area. Proof of both elements is the employer's prima
facie case. 28 When these two elements have been proven, the burden then shifts to the claimant to prove that he has tried to secure such work but has failed because of his disability. 29 The rule
in effect forces the claimant to reprove his original disability each
time the employer proves physical recovery and the general availability of jobs which claimant could conceivably perform.
The court in Abex followed the moving party rule in so far as
that rule places the burden of proof on the moving party. However, Abex felt that the requirement of a showing of only the general availability of jobs was unfair since the employer, as the moving party, should not be able to meet his burden of proof by a showing of facts which may not be relevant to the particular claimant.
The court stated that a disabled person does not stand on the same
footing as a non-disabled person. 0 Since employers may feel unable to rely on a partially disabled person's health, they may refuse
him a job which he may be physically able to perform.3 1 Hence, the
employer's proof that light work is generally available does not
mean that a partially disabled claimant will be able to secure such
work. To allow an employer to prove his case by such an unrealistic showing is unfair to a claimant who, despite a court's finding of partial recovery (accompanied by a reduction of disability
payments), finds it impossible to secure employment. To remedy
this inequity, the Abex court reasoned that the employer should
be required to make a realistic showing that a particular claimant,
with his peculiar disability, can actually secure employment. Thus,
the Abex decision now requires the employer to show the willingness of employers to hire the particular claimant in order to meet
his burden of proof.
The impact of this requirement of greater specificity of the employer's proof on the matter of the burden of proof in compensation
cases is important and should be noted. While obstensibly the court
is only increasing the specificity of the proof, a secondary effect of
the holding is to control the shifting of the burden of proof. The
required degree of the specificity of the proof determines how
easily the employer can meet his burden of proof. This in turn is
determinative of when, if ever, the burden of proof (to show the
unavailability of jobs) will shift to the claimant. By requiring a
28. Connelly's Case, 122 Me. 289, 119 A.2d 664 (1923); Holtz v. McGraw
& Bindley, 161 Pa. Super. 371, 54 A.2d 905 (1950). See also note 19 and
accompanying text supra.
29. Cases cited note 8 supra.
30.
31.

252 A.2d at 553.
Id.

greater degree of specificity than the pre-Abex moving party rule,
the Abex court has forced the burden of proof to remain on the employer.
Thus, the Abex decision maintains the spirit and effect of the
moving party rule: to place the burden of proof where it belongson the moving party-and to keep it there until the prima facie
case is realistically proved.
The Abex ruling also eliminated another undesirable consequence of the "general availability" requirement of the moving
party rule. Under the old pre-Abex rule, once the employer had
met his burden of proof, the claimant, in order to resist termination
of his compensation payments, had to prove that there actually
were no jobs available to him because of his disability. This was a
difficult, if not impossible, burden for the claimant to meet. Theoretically, it would require a canvassing of virtually the entire labor
market to determine the willingness (or hesitance) of employers
to hire claimant. Moreover, it is usually more difficult to prove the
non-existence of something rather than its existence.32 Abex corrected this inequity by requiring specific proof of the availability
of jobs for claimant. If the employer meets this burden of proof,
and the claimant cannot rebut it, the court will permit termination
of payments for total disability since it will have been realistically
proven that claimant has recovered and thus there is no further
need for compensation payments.
A great deal of the Abex decision was devoted to the degree
and the burden of proof required in similar cases in Pennsylvania,
where a different approach to the problem had been used. In
Pennsylvania, prior to 1967,33 once the employer proved that the
claimant was capable of performing general light work, a presumption arose that such work was available. 34 The burden then shifted
to claimant to prove the unavailability of suitable jobs in order to
resist modification of his compensation agreement.3 5 Under this
Pennsylvania rule, the employer's burden of proof was lessened
while the claimant's was made more difficult. The rule thus favored the employer. This result was inherently unfair to an uncomplaining claimant and was an illogical allocation of the burden of
proof. However, since the Abex court was discussing the burden
and specificity of proof in workmen's compensation cases, it felt
constrained to discuss the series of Pennsylvania cases which were
so antithetical to the Abex view.
32. Id. at 556.
33. Pennsylvania now apparently follows the majority moving party
rule. See Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co., 427 Pa. 5, 233 A.2d 891 (1967).
34. Sorby v. Three Rivers Motors, 178 Pa. Super. 187, 114 A.2d 347
(1955) (and cases cited therein); Earley v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal &
Iron Co., 144 Pa. Super. 301, 19 A.2d 615 (1941).
35. Sorby v. Three Rivers Motors, 178 Pa. Super. 187, 114 A.2d 347

(1955).
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IV.

THE EMPLOYER'S BURDEN UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA
PRESUMPTION RULE

The Pennsylvania rule was first pronounced by the Superior
Court in Consona v. R.E. Coulborn & Co.36 In Consona the court
held: "If a workman is proved able to do light work in general, it
may be presumed that such work is available. '3 7 Ten years later,
however, the same court in Earley v. Philadelphia and Reading
Coal and Iron Co.,35 construed Consona's ambiguous use of the
term "presumed" to mean that, once the employer has shown that
the claimant is capable of doing general light work, a legal presumption arises that such work is available. The effect of this legal presumption was to shift the burden of proof to the claimant to prove
that suitable jobs were unavailable once the employer had established that claimant was physically capable of performing such
jobs. Earley's use of the legal presumption shifting the burden of
proof to the claimant was followed in subsequent Pennsylvania
cases.3 9

36. 104 Pa. Super. 170. 158 A. 300 (1931).
37. Id. at 172, 158 A. at 300. Again, later in the case, the court
stated that "it may be presumed that work of that nature is available."
Based on the use of the word "may" the court probably did not intend
the term "presumed" to be interpreted in the evidentiary sense as a "presumption of fact," but rather in its lay sense of being roughly analogous
to "assumed." The meaning of the term "presumed" in Consona is at
best ambiguous.
38. 144 Pa. Super. 301, 19 A.2d 615 (1941). The case did differentiate
between two types of claimants: (1) those capable of doing general light
work, and (2) those claimants who are so disabled that they are only
capable of performing specially created "odd jobs" type of work. As to the
latter class, the presumption did not apply and the burden of proving the
availability of jobs was on the employer. But as to the former class, those
capable of performing general light work, the case held that the presumption certainly applies. This distinction between types of claimants is recognized in most other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Shroyer v. Industrial Conun'n,
98 Ariz. 388, 405 P.2d 875 (1965); State Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 196 Cal. App. 10, 16 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1961); Clark v.
Western Knapp Eng'r. Co., 190 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1966); Pelebat v. Portland
Box Co., 155 Me. 226, 153 A.2d 615 (1959); Lightner v. Cohn, 76 N.J. Super.
461, 184 A.2d 878 (1962); Jordan v. Decorative Co., 230 N.Y. 552, 130 N.E.
634 (1921).
39. Sorby v. Three Rivers Motors, 178 Pa. Super. 187, 114 A.2d 347
(1955) (and cases cited therein). In Sorby, the employer was petitioning to
have claimants' payments for total disability reduced to those for partial
disability. Claimant was shown to be capable of doing general light work.
Thus, the court held that the presumption that light work was available
was applicable and the burden was on the claimant to show that she could
not secure such work. Failing in this, the court held that claimant's disability was partial and payments were reduced accordingly.

A.

Attacks on the PennsylvaniaRule

The Abex court decided not to adopt the Pennsylvania presumption rule in Delaware. Part of the court's rationale for not
doing so came from subsequent Pennsylvania cases which modi40
fied and finally rejected the presumption rule.
In Unora v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 4 1 the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court recognized that the presumption rule was arbitrary and illogical and attempted to correct it. The court held that a realistic opportunity for claimant to engage in gainful employment must be
shown to exist.42 The Unora holding seems to overrule the presumption rule, and the burden of proving the availability of jobs
was apparently shifted to the employer. However, the case is unclear and cannot be considered to be a definitive statement of the
Pennsylvania law at that time. Furthermore, in Unora, a distinction must be noted. Claimant in Unora was not capable of doing
general light work, but was in the category of one who is only capable of performing specialized "odd jobs." But, since the presumption rule had never been applied to that type of claimant, the case
actually changed nothing in rejecting the presumption rule in the
Unora fact situation. The case appears to be largely a factual determination based on the fact that claimant was only capable of special work for which a reasonably stable market did not exist. In
holding that the employer must show the availability of work the
court did not really reject the presumption rule but actually only
43
restated Earley v. Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co.,
which held that an employer must show the availablity of jobs for
claimants who are only capable of doing specialized "odd jobs" type
of work which is difficult to find.
Another criticism of the presumption rule was stated by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Kirk v. L. Bauer, Jr., Inc. 4 Here
the court suggested that the presumption rule should be modified
into either an "inference" or a "rule of proof production. '40 As an
40. Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co., 427 Pa. 5, 233 A.2d 894 (1967); Kirk v.
L. Bauer, Jr., Inc., 20 Pa. Super. 357, 228 A.2d 228 (1967).
41. 377 Pa. 7, 104 A.2d 104 (1954).
42. Id. (The holding here is to be distinguished from that of the
main case. Here the required specificity of the proof is somewhat less
specific than in Abex).
43. 144 Pa. Super. 301, 19 A.2d 615 (1941). See also Transport Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 157 Cal. App. 2d 542, 321
P.2d 21 (D.C., 1st Dist., 1958); Cohen v. Doubleday & Co., 191 Pa. Super. 106,
155 A.2d 381 (1959); Cunningham v. Alex Guerrina & Sons, 188 Pa. Super.
106, 146 A.2d 319 (1958); In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 (1965).
44. 209 Pa. Super. 357, 228 A.2d 228 (1967). The court did say:
If the effect of the presumption, in this case, were really to impose
an almost insurmountable burden on the claimant to prove that
he could not find employment, then we should be tempted to discard it as unjust as well as unrealistic.
Id. at 362, 228 A.2d at 231.
45. Id. at 361, 228 A.2d at 231.
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inference, the rule would be construed as a "permissible consideration of the possibility that light work is available."4" The problem
with this approach, however, is that the difference between presumption and inference is largely semantic. The end result of both
is basically the same; the burden of proof shifts to the claimant. As
an inference the burden is on the claimant to rebut the inference
that jobs are available. The burden is identical under the presumption rule.
As a rule of proof production, according to Kirk, the burden of
proof would be determined by the comparative accessibility of each
party to the evidence.47 This seems more equitable than either
the presumption or the inference rule since the burden of proof
would vary according to the particular fact situation of each case.
However, there is no indication that this rule has ever been applied
by any court.
B. The Change in the PennsylvaniaLaw
The last case which the Abex court considered in its discussion
of the Pennsylvania Rule was Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co. 48 In
Petrone, claimant, a coal miner suffering from anthracosilicosis and
unable to return to the mines, appealed a lower court ruling that because he was able to do light work he was not totally disabled. The
only evidence presented by the employer as to the availability of
jobs was testimony by a doctor who stated that he believed claimant was capable of operating a power lawn mower or an elevator.
No expert testified that such jobs were available in the area. Furthermore, there was no testimony that, even if these jobs existed,
employers would hire disabled persons such as claimant. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that the presumption of the availability of suitable work
was invalid and that since the availability of suitable jobs had not
49
been shown, the employer had not met his burden of proof.

While Petrone did unequivocably reject the presumption rule,
the court also hinted at the Abex issue; that is, the specificity with
which the employer must show the availability of jobs for the claimant.50 The court suggested that more specific proof than a mere
showing of the existence of suitable jobs is needed to satisfy the
46.

Id.

47.

Kirk v. L. Bauer, Jr., Inc., 20 Pa. Super. 357, 228 A.2d 228 (1967).

48.

427 Pa. 5, 233 A.2d 891 (1967).

50.

Id.

49. Id. at 8, 233 A.2d at 894 (that rationale here seems to be, however,
that the very existerce of jobs was not shown).

employer's burden of proof. However, the decision in Petrone, unlike Abex, was based on a different ground; the fact that the availability of jobs, per se, was not shown. The employer, relying on
the presumption rule, offered no evidence on the availability of
jobs. Thus, since the court rejected the presumption rule, the case
was remanded in order to give the employer an opportunity to
present evidence as to the availability of jobs. 51 The basis for the
decision, therefore, was not that the employer failed to be specific
as to the availability of work for the claimant, but that he failed to
offer any proof as to the very existence of such work.
Thus, while Petrone suggested that some degree of specificity
was needed in showing the availability of jobs, its holding merely
rejected the presumption rule and shifted the burden of proof of the
general availability of jobs from the claimant to the employer.
Petrone determined the initial burden of proof rather than the nature and quality of that proof, and, as such, did not reach the Abex
question. The Abex issue of the specificity of proof (important in
determining if the burden of proof will shift to the claimant) was
not decided.
V.

THE ABEX REJECTION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE

The question
den of proof, but
keep the burden
strongly rejected

before the Abex court was not who had the burrather how specific that proof must be so as to
of proof on the employer.52 Thus, while Abex
the presumption rule, it is submitted that the

court in deciding the specificity question should not have been concerned with the presumption rule. At the time of the Abex decision
it was settled law in Delaware that the burden of proof as to the
availability of jobs is on the party who is petitioning for modification of the compensation agreement (i.e., the moving party).53 The
employer in Abex, as the moving party, did not challenge the Dela51. Id at 9, 233 A.2d at 895.
52. 252 A.2d at 556. In only one of the Pennsylvania cases was the
specificity of the proof even mentioned, and then only as dictum. Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co., 427 Pa. 5, 233 A.2d 891 (1967).
53. Cf. Braun & Co. v. Mason, 168 A.2d 105 (Del. Super. 1960). The
court held:
In our opinion the effect of 19 Del. C. § 2344 and 19 Del. C. § 2347
is to place upon the party seeking to modify an award by subsequent review the burden of establishing by a preponderance of
the evidence that the former award should be modified.
Id. at 107. This interpretation is questionable, however, in light of the
quoted statutes which do not specifically mention the burden of proof. The
statutes quoted read:
§ 2344-If the employer and the injured employee . . . reach an
agreement in regard to compensation ... it shall be final and
binding unless modified as provided in section 2347 of this title.
§ 2347-On the application of any party ... on the ground that the
incapacity has subsequently terminated, increased, diminished or
recurred . . . the board may ... review any agreement or award.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2344, 2347 (1953).
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ware law on the burden of proof, but rather admitted that he had
the burden of proof. 54 The only issue before the Abex court was the

degree of proof required as to the availability of jobs for a disabled
claimant. Adoption of the presumption rule would have been a
step backwards. Delaware had already gone further with the use
of the majority moving party rule.55
Furthermore, the Abex court's discussion of the use of the presumption rule in Pennsylvania is somewhat misleading. Abex
states that in all of the Pennsylvania cases where the presumption
rule was used, the claimant was the moving party. The Abex court,
therefore, reasoned that the Pennsylvania courts were justified in
using the presumption rule since claimant, as the moving party,
should have the burden of proof. The Delaware court states that
these Pennsylvania cases are distinguishable from Abex since in
Abex the employer was the moving party and would be unjustly relieved of his burden of proof if he were allowed simply to show the
general availability of jobs, thereby in effect shifting the burden
of proof to the claimant to show the unavailability of jobs. This
reasoning is the court's basis in Abex for increasing the employer's
burden of proof by requiring a greater specificity in that proof.56
It is submitted that the court in Abex was wrong in its interpretation of the Pennsylvania cases. The presumption rule was apparently applied in Pennsylvania regardless of who was the moving
party; it was utilized as soon as the employer had shown the claimant to be capable of doing general light work. The fact that claimants were the moving parties in the presumption cases reviewed by
Abex had no effect on the application of the presumption rule.
Moreover, in Petrone,57 claimant was again the moving party.
Thus, according to the Abex reasoning, the Petrone court would
have been justified in applying the presumption rule since the burden should have been on claimant, as the moving party. However,
the Petrone court, even though claimant was the moving party, refused to apply the presumption stating that it was illogical and not
based on sufficient facts. Petrone arrived at this decision without
regard to the fact that claimant was the moving party. Thus, the
reasoning in Abex for not adopting the presumption rule because
in its case, unlike the Pennsylvania presumption rule cases, the
employer was the moving party, is not substantiated by the
54.

252 A.2d at 553.

55. Ham v. Chrysler Corp., 231 A.2d 258 (Del. 1967); Hartnett Corp. v.

Coleman, 226 A.2d 910 (Del. 1967).
56. 252 A.2d at 555.
57. Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co., 427 Pa. 5, 233 A.2d 891 (1967).

Pennsylvania cases.
However, other criticisms stated by the Abex court of the presumption rule are more cogent and are adequate justification for
that court's rejection of the rule. For example, Abex states that
for a legal presumption to be valid, it must be based on fact and be
a reasonable and natural deduction from that fact.58 It is hardly
logical to believe that jobs exist simply because one is capable of
performing them. Such a belief is a non sequitur. Another valid
reason, stated by Abex, for rejecting the presumption rule was that
a disabled claimant rarely stands on an equal base with a nondisabled person. 9 Employers would rarely choose a disabled job
applicant over a non-disabled one. They would naturally be concerned about a disabled man's ability to work efficiently and steadily, and whether his good health would continue. A final reason
stated by Abex is the matter of expedience. It would normally be
easier for an employer, who is more knowledgeable as to the labor conditions than a claimant, to determine the availability of jobs
in the area. 60 Regardless of Abex' reasons for rejecting the rule,
however, it would seem, in light of the Pennsylvania court's rejection of the rule, that the Abex court arrived at a logical and rational conclusion in declining to adopt the presumption rule.
CONCLUSION

The State of the Law after the Abex Decision
The Abex holding leaves unchanged the Delaware law with regard to the question of who has the burden of proof as to the availability of jobs. The burden is still on the moving party. 61 This is
in accord with the majority of states.6 2 The major impact of the
Abex holding, however, is in the degree of specificity of the proof
required by the court as to the availability of suitable work for
claimant. The employer's burden of proof now must be a realistic
showing of the availability of jobs for a particular claimant.63 In
Abex, the employer argued that this was too great a burden and
that in effect, under this rule, he would be required to lead the
claimant to a new job. The court disagreed, stating that the em58. 252 A.2d at 555. See, e.g., Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co., 427 Pa. 5,
233 A.2d 891 (1967).
59. 252 A.2d at 553.
60. Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co., 427 Pa. 5, 233 A.2d 891 (1967).
61. 252 A.2d at 554.
62. The moving party rule is the majority rule. Cases cited note
19 supra.
63. 252 A.2d at 552. The court states:
A showing of physical ability to perform certain appropriate jobs
and general availability of such jobs is, in the court's opinion, an
insufficient showing of the availability of said jobs to a particular
claimant and that a showing of this latter factor is necessary to
satisfy the burden of proving that total disability has ended.
Id. at 553.
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ployer did not have to show the existence of a particular job at a
particular time. Rather, all the employer had to show was something more than the mere availability of general light work. He
had to prove the "general willingness" of employers to hire a man
4
with the claimant's particular qualifications and disability.
It is submitted that in so holding, the Abex court unnecessarily
weakened its holding and created unfortunate confusion. For, although the employer now must show a willingness of employers to
hire the particular claimant, he is not required to relocate the claimant in a new job. The distinction between the two seems small and
vague and does not present an adequate and unambiguous guideline
with which other courts can evaluate the adequacy of an employer's
proof.
The court should have held that in cases such as this, where the
employer is the moving party, he should find the work for claimant
which he alleges to be available. Proving that employers exist
who would be willing to hire the claimant is tantamount to relocating him anyway. Requiring the relocation of the claimant would
have been only a slight extension of the Abex holding, would have
caused little additional hardship on the employer, effectively replaced the compensation which the employer alleges is no longer
needed by claimant, and clarified completely the degree of specificity required. Thus, although Abex was a step towards establishing a more realistic standard with which to judge alleged recovery in compensation cases, some further extension would seem
to be warranted.
JON A. SNOWDON, JR.
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